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Abstract
Adversarial attacks are malicious inputs that derail machine-learning models. We
propose a scheme to attack autoencoders, as well as a quantitative evaluation
framework that correlates well with the qualitative assessment of the attacks. We
assess — with statistically validated experiments — the resistance to attacks of
three variational autoencoders (simple, convolutional, and DRAW) in three datasets
(MNIST, SVHN, CelebA), showing that both DRAW’s recurrence and attention
mechanism lead to better resistance. As autoencoders are proposed for compressing
data — a scenario in which their safety is paramount — we expect more attention
will be given to adversarial attacks on them.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attacks derail models by crafting malicious inputs. Image classifiers mislabel those inputs
— visually indistinguishable from ordinary ones — with high confidence.
In comparison to the extensive literature on adversarial attacks for classifiers, attacks for autoencoders
are mostly unexplored, possibly because those attacks are hard both to perform and to assess. Still, as
autoencoders are advanced as powerful schemes for compressing information [1], attacks on them
are potentially at least as dangerous as attacks on classifiers. In a hypothetical example, an attacker
may present someone a document (e.g., a contract, or agreement), which upon transmission turns
into a different one (Figure 1).
Evaluating generative models is hard [3], there are no clear-cut success criteria for autoencoder
reconstruction, and therefore, neither for the attack. We bypass that difficulty by analyzing how
inputs and outputs differ across varying compromises between distorting the input and approaching
the target.
In this paper, we propose a scheme to attack autoencoders, as well as a quantitative evaluation
framework for the attacks that bypass the need for a success criterion. We compare three kinds of
autoencoders: simple variational autoencoders (with fully-connected layers), convolutional variational
autoencoders, and DRAW — a recently proposed recurrent variational autoencoder with an attention
mechanism [4]. We show that the latter is more resistant to the attacks, and that its recurrent
and attention mechanism both contribute to the resistance. We run all — statistically validated —
experiments in three datasets (MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA) and show that our quantitative assessment
correlates well with a qualitative perception of the attacks.
2 Autoencoders, Generative Models, and Variational Autoencoders
Autoencoders are neural networks that compress their input into a smaller latent representation
(encoder), and then reconstruct the input from that representation (decoder). Autoencoders are trained
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end-to-end by backpropagation, with a loss that reflects the difference between input and output, e.g.,
`2. (Figure 2)
Autoencoders admit many variations: sparse [5], denoising [6], variational [7, 8], Wasserstein [9],
symmetric [10], etc. They differ on the encoding/decoding architectures, on the computation of the
loss, or on the noise inserted into the network.
Variational autoencoders (VAEs) are particularly interesting since they behave as both autoencoders
and as generative models. VAEs have stochastic latent representations, which, once trained, can be
decoded to generate samples similar (but not identical) to those in the original dataset. Together with
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [11], VAEs are the most studied deep generative models.
There are attempts to unify VAEs and GANs into a single framework [10, 12, 13, 14, 15]. Although
that generative aspect of VAEs is one of their main appeals, in this paper we will approach them only
as autoencoders.
In VAEs, the latent representation is a parametric distribution. The encoder outputs the parameters of
that distribution from the observed input. The decoder samples the latent distribution and tries to
reconstruct something similar to the input. VAEs learn the encoder and decoder parameters end-to-end
by backpropagation, maximizing the probability that sampling from the latent distribution leads to a
good reconstruction of the input, in a maximum marginal likelihood framework.
The encoder and decoder can be implemented with different neural architectures: multilayer per-
ceptron [7], convolutional [16], or even recurrent [17]. We are particularly interested in the recently
proposed DRAW [4], which uses LSTMs with an attention mechanism, using a metaphor of “painting”
the image in a canvas, step by step.
Formally, VAEs are probabilistic models that aim at maximizing pθ(x), x ∈ X , where X is our
training set, and θ are the network parameters. We introduce a stochastic latent representation z and
maximize the marginal probability distribution (Equation 1) over it:
pθ(x) =
∫
pθ(x, z)dz =
∫
pθ(x|z)p(z)dz (1)
In theory, the prior p(z) is arbitrary, but in practice a standard multivariate Gaussian N (0, I) is
most often employed [7]. Since the integration in Equation 1 is intractable, we opt to maximize its
variational lower bound (Equation 2), where φ ⊂ θ are the encoder parameters and DKL is the KL
divergence.
log pθ(x) ≥ Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x|z)]−DKL(qφ(z|x) ‖ p(z)) = −DKL(qφ(z|x) ‖ p(z|x)) (2)
In variational approaches, an approximate posterior is used in place of the true posterior pφ(z|x).
In VAEs, this approximate posterior is decoderψ(qφ(z|x)), where ψ ⊂ θ are the parameters of the
decoder and qφ(z|x) usually is an uncorrelated multivariate Gaussian as shown in Equation 3.
qφ(z|x) = N (µφ(x), exp(σ2φ(x))) (3)
VAEs exploit the universal approximator property of neural networks [18] to use a Gaussian distribu-
tion in Equation 2, and transform the posterior by learning the decoder parameters. That approach
makes the problem tractable, since the KL divergence now has analytic form [7]. Finally, the “repa-
rameterization trick” allows the model to be differentiated end-to-end [19]. The trick consists on
parameterizing the random variables z ∼ qφ(z|x) as a differentiable transformation of a noise
variable  ∼ N (0, I) such as z ∼ µφ(x) + σφ(x).
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Figure 1: A motivating example: an attacker may convince a sender to transmit a seemingly innocent
document that is reconstructed in a malicious way. (Scenario inspired by [2]).
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Figure 2: Autoencoders are models that map their input into a (deterministic or stochastic) latent
representation, and then map such representation into an output similar to the input; those two maps
form the two halves of the model: the encoder and the decoder.
3 Adversarial Attacks on Variational Autoencoders
Following the seminal paper of Szegedy et al. [20], adversarial attacks on neural networks classifiers
attracted much attention [21, 22, 23]. Those attacks aim at creating small distortions on the input (most
often images) that lead to misclassification. Attacks can aim at a target wrong class [20, 22, 24, 25]
(targeted), or they can aim at any class other than the right one (untargeted) [21, 26]. State-of-the-art
attacks produce essentially imperceptible distortions that make the classifier predict the wrong class
with high confidence.
Attacking autoencoders follows a parallel course: the aim is to induce minimal distortions on the
input that disrupt the reconstructed output (Figure 3). The attack can aim at reconstructing a particular
wrong input (targeted), or just at thwarting the reconstruction (untargeted). In this paper we focus on
targeted attacks.
Compared to attacks on classifiers, attacks on autoencoders are much less explored. Sabour et
al. [27], while still working on classifiers, introduced the notion of attacking internal layers of deep
neural networks. Tabacof et al. [28] introduced attacks on autoencoders and variational autoencoders,
showing that they are possible, although much harder than attacks on classifiers. They attacked the
latent representation with a KL-divergence objective in both MNIST and SVHN. They proposed the
graphs we call Distortion–Distortion plots here and evaluated attack success by visual inspection of
those graphs. They also showed that there is a linear compromise between the intensity of the input
distortion and the degree of success in the attack for both autoencoders and classifiers. Kos et al. [2]
followed up with a work that attacked both the latent representation and the output of VAE–GAN
autoencoders. They proposed three modes of attack: attacking an extraneous classifier after the latent
representation, attacking the latent representation directly with an `2 objective, and attacking the
output of the decoder using the VAE loss function. They introduced a quantitative, although indirect,
evaluation of attack inferred from success in fooling the extraneous classifier.
Attacking autoencoders is a more involved procedure than attacking classifiers. In the latter we target
a small output vector, often focusing at just one or two values on that vector. In the former we need
to address a very high-dimensional output. Targeted attacks to autoencoders consist in adding (as
small as possible) adversarial distortion to the original input in order make the reconstructed output
as close as possible to the target (Figure 3).
Attacks are performed on trained models, whose weights are kept constant, while minimizing the
change to the input. The most “obvious” attack also minimizes the difference between the output and
the target, as explained in Equation 4.
min
d
∆(ra,It) +C‖d‖
s.t. L ≤ x+d ≤ U, za = encoder(x+d), ra = decoder(za)
(4)
where d is the adversarial distortion, x+ d is the adversarial input, and its output reconstruction ra
is reconstructed from a sample of za (the latent representation, which in variational autoencoders is a
distribution). L and U are the bounds of the input space, i.e., L ≤ x ≤ U,∀x that is valid as input to
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Figure 3: Adversarial attacks for autoencoders aim at disrupting the reconstruction as much as
possible, while minimizing the distortion on the input. On targeted attacks, the challenge is inducing
the autoencoder to reconstruct a different sample. We evaluate attacks on the latent representation
layer (1), and on the output layer (2).
the encoder. C is the regularization constant that balances approaching the target and limiting the
input distortion. It is the target, and ∆ is the distance used to compare it to the output, in our case, `2.
A less obvious attack minimizes the difference between latent representations, which attacks the
network at its smallest layer. That attack implies solving the optimization in Equation 5.
min
d
∆(za,zt) +C‖d‖
s.t. L ≤ x+d ≤ U, za = encoder(x+d)
(5)
where zt is the latent representation of the target, and the other symbols are the same as in Equation 4.
Here, use the KL-divergence as ∆. Although it is not a true metric, it intuitively measures the
(asymmetric) difference between two distributions, so it is a proxy for the distance between the latent
representations.
4 Measuring the Success of Attacks on Autoencoders
When attacking classifiers, there is a clear-cut criterion for success: the target class has higher
probability than all others (on targeted attacks), or the right class has lower probability than some
other (on untargeted attacks). That criterion is used, in one way or another, to perform the attack: one
can optimize the input distortion until that criterion is satisfied [20, 22], establish a maximum input
distortion and observe if the criterion is satisfied [21, 27], etc.
When attacking autoencoders, we want to maximize the disruption on the output (untargeted attacks)
or its similarity to a target image (targeted attacks), while minimizing the input distortion, but there is
no sharp criterion for success.
For targeted attacks, Tabacof et al. [28] proposed graphs that examine the entire spectrum of compro-
mises between approaching the target and distorting the original (Figure 4). They do not name such
graphs, which we choose to call Distortion–Distortion plots. Using a set of boundaries (explained
below), they normalize those graphs, and use visual inspection on stacked normalized plots of various
cases to compare attacks.
Kos et al. [2] provide a quantitative metric based on an ancillary classifier network. The classifier
uses the latent representation as input, and is trained on labels that may be arbitrary, but must have
a relationship to the input (they cannot be random labels). They compute two metrics: success
rate ignoring the target (how often the reconstruction of the attack input mislead the classifier), and
success considering the target (how often the reconstruction of the attack input matched with the
class of the target).
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Those propositions have complementary drawbacks. Tabacof et al.’s allows only qualitative analysis.
Kos et al.’s evaluate a different criterion than we evaluate here: not whether the target is reconstructed
(in semantics and appearance), but whether it reproduces the semantics of the class. It works only for
labeled data.
Figure 4: Left: the proposed metric: Area Under the Distortion–Distortion Curve (AUDDC). Right:
visualization of a single point (red dot) of the left plot.
We address those shortcomings with the AUDDC (Area under Distortion–Distortion Curve). For a
given original and target pair, we compute different results, with different approximation compromises.
All attacks can vary, in one way or another, this compromise: in our case, we vary the values of C in
Equations 4 and 5). The Distortion–Distortion plots show, for each attempt, how much we distorted
the original and how much we approached the target (both measured by `2). We add limiting lines to
the plot: no distortion added (and original reconstruction) at the leftmost/gray and topmost/orange
lines; the `2-distance between the target and the reconstruction of the target by the model at the
bottommost/red line; the `2-distance between the original and target image. Those limits represent,
respectively, the starting point, the intrinsic limitation of the model, and the maximum “sensible”
distortion (which allows going from the original to the target directly). We normalize the graph so
that the distance between those lines is 1. The AUDDC is the area under the curve given by the linear
interpolation of the points. The closer this area is to 1, the more resistant the model was to the attack
(the less successful the attack was).
5 Data and Methods
Datasets: We employed three datasets — MNIST [29], SVHN [30], and CelebA [31] — with the
respective training and test splits. We expected those datasets to present increasing levels of challenge
for the autoencoders: MNIST has handwritten decimal single digits, without color, SVHN has
multi-digit street numbers in several styles and colors, and CelebA has human faces in color.
Models: We evaluated four models — variational autoencoder with fully-connected layers as en-
coder/decoder (VAE); variational autoencoder with convolutional layers as encoder and deconvolu-
tional layers as decoder (CVAE); the recurrent autoencoder DRAW [4] without and with its attention
mechanism. Following literature [7], we modeled pixel likelihoods as independent Bernoullis in
MNIST, and as independent Gaussians in SVHN and CelebA. In all models, the latent representations
(za and zt in Equations 4 and 5) are uncorrelated multivariate normal distributions with parameters
given by the encoder.
Extended hyperparameter exploration was not the scope of this study. Still, adversarial attacks are
not interesting if the attacked model is bad in itself. To obtain good reconstructions, we started
with hyperparameters given by deep learning “guild knowledge” on each dataset, and made minimal
fine-tuning until the reconstruction quality (without attack) was good. For DRAW, we start with the
models suggested in the original paper [4]. The quality of each model can be appreciated in Figure 5.
We give details about the models below:
VAE (all datasets) — Encoder and Decoder: fully(512)→ fully(512).
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CVAE–MNIST — Encoder: conv(32,4) → conv(64,4) → conv(128,4) → fully(512); De-
coder: fully(512)→ dconv(128,3)→ dconv(64,3)→ dconv(32,2)→ dconv(16,2).
CVAE–SVHN — Encoder: same as MNIST; Decoder: fully(512)→ dconv(128,5)→ dconv(64,5)→
dconv(32,5).
CVAE–CelebA — Encoder: conv(32,4)→ conv(64,4)→ conv(128,4)→ conv(256,4)→ fully(512);
Decoder: fully(512)→ dconv(256,5)→ dconv(128,5)→ dconv(64,5)→ dconv(32,5).
DRAW–MNIST — Encoder and Decoder: LSTM = 256 units, attention window = 8×8 pixels.
DRAW–SVHN — Encoder and Decoder: LSTM = 256 units, attention window = 16×16 pixels.
DRAW–CelebA — Encoder and Decoder: LSTM = 2500 units (1 timestep) / 400 units (16 timesteps),
attention window = 24×24 pixels.
In the notation above, fully(x) is a fully-connected layer with x units, and (d)conv(x,y) is a
(de)convolutional layer with x filters of size y. All (de)convolutional layers had stride = 2.
Training: Each model was trained for 500 epochs. At every 10 epochs, we evaluated the loss on the
validation set – 20% of random samples removed from the training set – keeping the weights that
offered minimal loss. The training/validation loss was the ELBO (Equation 2). We approximated the
expectation by sampling the posterior once. We extracted the gradients with automatic differentiation
and maximized the ELBO with Adam [32], with a learning rate of 10−4 and batch size of 128.
Evaluating: For each dataset, we picked at random an evaluation set with 20 original–target image
pairs from the test set. The evaluation set is the same across all models evaluated, to reduce spurious
variability. We show an example of a pair of input and reconstructed image in Figure 2.
To evaluate a given image-pair, we perform the attack as explained below, for 51 values of the
regularization constant C ({0} ∪ {2i}, with 50 values of i equally spaced between −20 and 20,
inclusive. After all 51 attacks are completed, we compute the metric (explained in Section 4) for that
image-pair.
Attacking: To compute a single point on the Distortion–Distortion plot we pick a value for the
regularization constant C and solve the optimization problem described in Equation 5 (if attacking
the latent representation) or in Equation 4 (if attacking the output). The model itself does not change
during the attack: its weights remain constant.
We use L-BFGS-B [33] as optimizer, with initial disturbance sampled from a uniform distribution
U(10−8, 108), 25 corrections on the memory matrix, and termination test tolerance of 10. All other
parameters are SciPy [34] defaults. L-BFGS-B ensures the constraints on pixel limits, and is often
employed for adversarial attacks [20].
Since VAEs are inherently stochastic, we performed 128 attacks to compute a single point — we
implemented this as working on a batch of images, where all inputs are the original image, and all
outputs are the target image. The measured distortions for the point (Section 4) are the average
distortion for the 128 attempts.
Experimental Design: we considered five factors (with respective levels) in our design: (1) Dataset:
MNIST, SVHN, CelebA; (2) Model: VAE, C-VAE, DRAW, DRAW-Attention; (3) Size of latent
representation: Small, Large (32 vs. 128 for MNIST and SVHN; 256 vs. 2048 for CelebA); (4)
Timesteps: 1, 16 (only for DRAW and DRAW-Attention); (5) Layer attacked: Latent, Output.
That design resulted in 72 treatments. Each treatment is evaluated across the 20 image-pairs in the
evaluation set of its dataset, and assigned the average of the evaluation metric over those pairs.
We did both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. For the quantitative analysis, we averaged
the AUDDC for the chosen factors. To check which factors lead to significant influence, we used a
multi-way ANOVA, with second-order interactions, and post-hoc Tukey honest significant differences.
For the qualitative analysis, we visually analyzed the results of five randomly selected image-pairs
from each dataset.
Hardware/Software: We coded 1 all models in Python 3.6, SciPy 1.0.0 and Tensorflow 1.4.1 [35].
We ran the experiments in NVIDIA GPUs (GTX Titan X Maxwell, Titan X Pascal, and NVIDIA
1The code can be found at https://github.com/gondimribeiro/adv-attacks-vae/.
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Table 1: Average ± 95%-confidence interval of AUDDC for all models and datasets.
Higher values indicate higher resistance to the attacks.
VAE CVAE DRAW* DRAW DRAW* DRAW
Steps — — 1 1 16 16
Attacks on latent representation
MNIST 27 ± 2 35 ± 3 27 ± 1 35 ± 3 71 ± 5 91 ± 3 47 ± 3
SVHN 19 ± 1 18 ± 1 09 ± 1 27 ± 2 74 ± 6 96 ± 2 41 ± 4
CelebA 31 ± 1 28 ± 1 21 ± 2 36 ± 1 81 ± 4 97 ± 1 49 ± 4
25 ± 1 27 ± 2 19 ± 2 33 ± 1 75 ± 3 95 ± 1 46 ± 2
Attacks on output
MNIST 35 ± 2 56 ± 3 38 ± 2 48 ± 4 29 ± 3 69 ± 4 46 ± 2
SVHN 19 ± 1 19 ± 2 13 ± 1 27 ± 2 21 ± 2 34 ± 2 22 ± 1
CelebA 27 ± 1 24 ± 1 31 ± 3 35 ± 1 29 ± 2 40 ± 1 31 ± 1
27 ± 1 33 ± 3 27 ± 2 37 ± 2 26 ± 1 47 ± 3 33 ± 1
All attacks
MNIST 31 ± 2 45 ± 3 32 ± 2 42 ± 3 50 ± 5 80 ± 3 47 ± 2
SVHN 19 ± 1 19 ± 1 11 ± 1 27 ± 1 47 ± 7 65 ± 7 31 ± 2
CelebA 29 ± 1 26 ± 1 26 ± 2 36 ± 1 55 ± 6 68 ± 7 40 ± 2
26 ± 1 30 ± 2 23 ± 1 35 ± 1 51 ± 4 71 ± 3 39 ± 1
* Attention mechanism disabled.
Tesla P100). We ran the statistical analyses in R 3.4.3. The source code, statistical scripts, and
detailed results for each image-pair are available as supplemental material.
6 Results and Analysis
Table 1 summarizes the main quantitative results. We show the averages and 95%-confidence intervals
of the AUDDC for every combination of model, dataset, number of timesteps (for DRAW), and layer
attacked, as well as the marginal statistics. We averaged over the size of latent representation and the
image-pairs. The values appear ×100 to reduce visual clutter. The ANOVA + post-hoc Tukey found
significant differences (all p-values<0.015) for all pairs of levels of all factors shown on the table.
Attacking auto-encoders is relatively difficult if compared to attacking classifiers, where the distortions
can be invisible to the human eye. Different models pose different challenges for the attack. DRAW,
in particular, was much more resistant to our attacks — and both its recurrent mechanism and
its attention mechanism were important in conferring that resistance. The choice of datasets also
influenced the challenges, with SVHN being the easiest to attack, and CelebA being the hardest.
The qualitative results appear in Figure 5. Although some features are immediately visible, to better
appreciate the details, we suggest zooming in the digital version of the article. We contrast VAE,
CVAE, DRAW without attention, and DRAW (both with 16 timesteps). We picked the most successful
attack for each model (latent layer for VAE and CVAE, output layer for DRAW), the opposite case is
available as supplemental material. For each dataset, we sampled at random five image pairs from
the twenty used in the evaluation. For each experiment, a single image-pair consists of 51 attacks
(different values of the regularization constant). In each case, we chose a mid-way attack, the closest
to the average in the horizontal axis of the Distortion–Distortion plot (as shown in the red dot in
Figure 4)
Attacking autoencoders is clearly difficult: no attack succeed in reconstructing the target image well
without incurring in immediately visible distortions to the input. Again, the superior resistance of
DRAW with attention appears: the attacks fail to reach the target, incur in large distortions to the
input, or both. Although we only attempted targeted attacks, untargeted resistance can be appreciated
to some extent, by comparing in each group (b) to (e) the 1st and the 3rd columns: if the model
resisted the attack, those columns should be nearly identical.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Figure 5: Visual analysis of results. Original image (a); results for VAE (b), CVAE, (c), DRAW
without attention, and (d) DRAW; target image (f). Both DRAW with 16 timesteps. Image-pairs
picked at random (from 20 evaluated for each dataset). In each group (b) to (e), from left to right:
reconstruction of original (1st); attack input (2nd); attack output (3rd); reconstruction of target (4th).
A perfect attack would make (2nd) indistinguishable from (a) and (3rd) indistinguishable from (4th).
7 Discussion
Attacking autoencoders remains a hard task. No attack can both convincingly reconstruct the target
while keeping the distortions on the input imperceptible. Still, not all attempts are equal: some models
are significantly more resistant than others. The AUDDC metric allows quantifying that resistance,
bypassing the need to establish a clear-cut criterion of success for the attacks. We attempted other
metrics (e.g., the slope of a regression on the Distortion–Distortion plots) but found that the AUDDC
is better correlated with our subjective perception of resistance to attacks.
We expected attacks on SVHN to be more challenging than on MNIST, but neither the quantitative or
the qualitative analyses confirmed this: the easiest dataset was SVHN, and the harder (as expected)
was CelebA. Maybe the smaller surface of attack of MNIST (28×28 input values) compensates for
its simplicity, while the huge complexity of CelebA compensates for its larger surface of attack.
Our results suggest a correlation between the autoencoders intrinsic quality and its resistance to
attack. Such correlation does not exist for classifiers, where the best models are not necessarily less
susceptible [22]. Precisely what makes a dataset or model harder to attack is still an exciting open
question for future works.
The literature on adversarial attacks on autoencoders is extremely scarce. We expect this to change as
autoencoders are advanced as compression schemes for data transmission and storage — scenarios in
which their safety will become paramount.
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